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Abstract
A set of reforms proposed in 1999 directed the police how to conduct an eyewitness
lineup. The promise of these system variable reforms was that they would enhance
eyewitness accuracy. However, the promising initial evidence in support of this claim
failed to materialize; at best, these reforms make an eyewitness more conservative.
The chapter begins by reviewing the initial evidence supporting the move to descrip-
tion-matched ﬁller selection, unbiased instructions, sequential presentation, and the
discounting of conﬁdence judgments. We next describe four reasons why the ﬁeld
reached incorrect conclusions regarding these reforms. These include a failure to
appreciate the distinction between discriminability and response bias, a reliance on
summary measures of performance that conﬂate discriminability and response bias
or mask the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy, and the distorting role
of relative judgment theory. The reforms are then reevaluated in light of these factors
and recent empirical data. We conclude by calling for a theory-driven approach to
developing and evaluating the next generation of system variable reforms.
1. INTRODUCTION
In October 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice released a document
entitledEyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical Working
Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999), which proposed a set of guidelines
for collecting and preserving eyewitness evidence (Wells et al., 2000). The
guidelines proposed a set of reforms that were expected to enhance the
accuracy of eyewitness evidence. The establishment of these guidelines
was a noteworthy achievement for psychology, and was heralded as a “suc-
cessful application of eyewitness research,” “from the lab to the police sta-
tion.” Yet, as we shall see, the ﬁeld got some of these reforms wrong.
The goal of this chapter is to examine how that happened.
Intuitively, there would seem to be few kinds of evidence more compel-
ling than an eyewitness conﬁdently identifying the defendant in a court of
law. From a strictly legal perspective, eyewitness identiﬁcation (ID) is direct
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Its compelling nature is not surprising if
you strongly or mostly agree that memory works like a video recorder, as
did 63% of Simons and Chabris’ (2011) representative sample of U.S. adults.
Of course, the veracity of that claim has been challenged by countless exper-
iments (for reviews see Loftus, 1979, 2003; Roediger, 1996; Roediger &
McDermott, 2000; Schacter, 1999) and, in a different way, by the over
1400 exonerations reported by the National Registry of Exonerations
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(eyewitness misidentiﬁcation played a role in 36% of these false convictions)
(www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/).
There are a number of factors that adversely affect the accuracy of
eyewitness ID of strangers and that can help one understand how it is that
honest, well-meaning eyewitnesses can make such consequential errors.
These include general factors that characterize normal memory functioning,
like its constructive nature (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998) and poor
source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). But it also
includes factors more germane to eyewitness ID, like limitations in the
opportunity to observe (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003), the adverse effects
of stress on attention and memory (Morgan et al., 2004), and the difﬁculty
of cross-racial IDs (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Wells (1978) referred to
factors like these as estimator variables, because researchers can only estimate
the impact of these variables on the performance of eyewitnesses. There is
little the criminal justice system can do to counteract the adverse impact
of these factors. Wells contrasted estimator variables with system variables,
which are variables that are under the control of the criminal justice system.
System variable research can be divided into two categories. One category
focuses on the interviewing of potential eyewitnesses (for example, by using
the Cognitive Interview, e.g., Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). The other cate-
gory focuses on ID evidence and how it should be collected. The collection
of ID evidence is the focus of this chapter, particularly the role played by the
lineup procedure. The aforementioned guidelines pronounced a series of
reforms for how to collect ID evidence using lineups that were supposed
to enhance the accuracy of that evidence.
The chapter is divided into four main parts. Section 2 reviews the evi-
dence for these reforms at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst centurydwhen
the recommendations were being made and adopted (Farmer, Attorney
General, New Jersey, 2001). We brieﬂy review the empirical evidence sup-
porting the move to description-matched ﬁller selection, unbiased instruc-
tions, sequential presentation, discounting conﬁdence judgments, and
double-blind lineup administration. Section 3 lays out four reasons why
the ﬁeld reached incorrect conclusions about several of these reforms. These
include a failure to appreciate the distinction between discriminability and
response bias; a reliance on summary measures of performance that conﬂate
discriminability and response bias; the distorting role of theory; and a reso-
lute (even myopic) focus on preventing the conviction of the innocent.
Section 4 reexamines the reforms in light of the factors detailed in Section 3
and recent empirical data. Section 5 lays out the direction forward,
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describing a more theory-driven approach to developing and evaluating the
next generation of system variable reforms.
2. EYEWITNESS REFORMS
The guidelines focused on many different aspects regarding how a
lineup should be conducted, from its construction to the response made
by the eyewitness. One reform recommends that a lineup should include
only one suspect (Wells & Turtle, 1986). That means that the remaining
members of the lineup should consist of known-innocent individuals called
ﬁllers. The rationale for the inclusion of ﬁllers is to ensure that the lineup is
not biased against a possibly innocent suspect. One factor to consider is how
closely the ﬁllers should resemble the perpetrator (Luus & Wells, 1991). To
achieve the appropriate level of similarity, another recommendation requires
that the ﬁllers should match the description of the perpetrator (as reported by
the eyewitness prior to viewing the lineup). Description-matched ﬁllersd
that is, ﬁllers chosen based on verbal descriptorsdwere argued to be superior
to ﬁllers chosen based on their visual resemblance to the suspect (Luus &
Wells, 1991; Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993). Next, prior to viewing the
lineup, an eyewitness should receive unbiased instructions that the perpe-
trator may or may not be present (Malpass & Devine, 1981). Another sug-
gestion involved how the lineup members should be presented to the
eyewitness. The sequential presentation method presented lineup members
one at a time, requiring a decision regarding whether #1 is the perpetrator
before proceeding to #2, and so on (Lindsay &Wells, 1985; for a review see
Gronlund, Andersen, & Perry, 2013). Once an eyewitness rejects a lineup
member and moves on to the next option, a previously rejected option
cannot be chosen. Also, as originally conceived, the eyewitness would not
know how many lineup members were to be presented. Finally, because
the conﬁdence that an eyewitness expresses is malleable (Wells & Bradﬁeld,
1998), conﬁdence was not deemed a reliable indicator of accuracy; only a
binary ID or rejection decision was forthcoming from a lineup. Another
recommendation, not included in the original guidelines, has since become
commonplace. This involves conducting double-blind lineups (Wells et al.,
1998). If the lineup administrator does not know who the suspect is, the
administrator cannot provide any explicit or implicit guidance regarding
selecting that suspect. Table 1 summarizes these reforms; the numeric entries
refer to the subsections that follow.
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Eyewitness researchers generally rallied behind the merit of these sug-
gested reforms. Kassin Tubb, Hosch, and Memon (2001) surveyed 64
experts regarding the “general acceptance” of some 30 eyewitness phenom-
ena. Several of these phenomena are related to the aforementioned reforms,
including unbiased lineup instructions, lineup fairness and the selection of
ﬁllers by matching to the description, sequential lineup presentation, and
the poor conﬁdenceeaccuracy relationship. From 70% to 98% of the
experts responded that these phenomena were reliable. For example,
“The more members of a lineup resemble the suspect, the higher is the like-
lihood that identiﬁcation of the suspect is accurate”; “The more that mem-
bers of a lineup resemble a witness’s description of the culprit, the more
accurate an identiﬁcation of the suspect is likely to be”; “Witnesses are
more likely to misidentify someone by making a relative judgment when
presented with a simultaneous (as opposed to a sequential) lineup”; “An eye-
witness’s conﬁdence is not a good predictor of his or her identiﬁcation
accuracy” (Kassin et al., 2001, p. 408).
We will brieﬂy review the rationale and the relevant data that sup-
ported these reforms (for more details see Clark, 2012; Clark, Moreland,
& Gronlund, 2014; Gronlund, Goodsell, & Andersen, 2012). But before
doing so, some brief terminology is necessary. In the laboratory, two types
of lineup trials are necessary to simulate situations in which the police have
Table 1 Eyewitness reforms from Wells et al. (2000)
Proposed reform Description
One suspect per lineup Each lineup contains only one suspect and
the remainder are known-innocent
ﬁllers
2.1 Lineup ﬁllers: ﬁller similarity Fillers similar enough to the suspect to
ensure that the lineup is not biased
against a possibly innocent suspect
2.1 Lineup ﬁllers: ﬁller selection Select ﬁllers based on description of the
perpetrator rather than visual
resemblance to the suspect
2.2 Unbiased instructions Instruct eyewitness that the perpetrator
may or may not be present
2.3 Sequential presentation Present lineup members to the eyewitness
one at a time as opposed to all at once
2.4 Proper consideration of
conﬁdence
Eyewitness conﬁdence can inﬂate due to
conﬁrming feedback
2.5 Double-blind lineup
administration
Neither the lineup administrator nor the
eyewitness knows who the suspect is
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placed a guilty or an innocent suspect into a lineup. A target-present lineup
contains the actual perpetrator (a guilty suspect). In the lab, a target-absent
lineup is constructed by replacing the guilty suspect with a designated
innocent suspect. If an eyewitness selects the guilty suspect from a
target-present lineup, it is a correct ID. An eyewitness makes a false ID
when he or she selects the innocent suspect from a target-absent lineup.
An eyewitness also can reject the lineup, indicating that the guilty suspect
is not present. Of course, this is the correct decision if the lineup is target-
absent. Finally, an eyewitness can select a ﬁller. In contrast to false IDs of
innocent suspects, ﬁller IDs are not dangerous errors because the police
know these individuals to be innocent.
2.1 Proper Choice of Lineup Fillers
There are two factors to consider regarding choosing ﬁllers for a lineup.
Filler similarity encompasses how similar the ﬁllers should be to the suspect.
Once the appropriate degree of similarity is determined, ﬁller selection com-
prises how to choose those ﬁllers. Regarding ﬁller similarity, Lindsay and
Wells (1980) varied whether or not the ﬁllers matched a perpetrator’s
description. They found that the false ID rate was much lower when the
ﬁllers matched the description. The correct ID rate also dropped, but not
signiﬁcantly. Therefore, according to this reform, fair lineups (ﬁllers match
the description) are better than biased lineups (the ﬁllers do not match the
description).
If fair lineups are better, how does one go about selecting those ﬁllers?
Two methods were compared. The suspect-matched approach involves
selecting ﬁllers who visually resemble a suspect; the description-matched
approach requires selecting ﬁllers who match the perpetrator’s verbal
description. Wells et al. (1993) compared these two methods of ﬁller selec-
tion and found no signiﬁcant difference in false ID rates, but description-
matched selection resulted in a greater correct ID rate. Lindsay, Martin,
and Webber (1994) found similar results.
Navon (1992) and Tunnicliff and Clark (2000) also noted that suspect-
matched ﬁller selection could result in an innocent suspect being more
similar to the perpetrator than any of the ﬁllers. Navon called this the back-
ﬁre effect, which Tunnicliff and Clark describe as follows: An innocent per-
son becomes a suspect because the police make a judgment that he matches
the description of the perpetrator, but the ﬁllers are chosen because they are
judged to match the innocent suspect, not because they are judged to match
the perpetrator’s description. Consequently, the innocent suspect is more
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likely to be identiﬁed because he or she is once removed from the perpe-
trator (matches the description), but the suspect-matched ﬁllers are twice
removed (they match the person who matches the description). Based on
the aforementioned data, and this potential problem, the guidelines declared
description-matched ﬁller selection superior.
2.2 Unbiased Instructions
Malpass and Devine (1981) compared two sets of instructions. Biased
instructions led participants to believe that the perpetrator was in the lineup,
and the accompanying response sheet did not include a perpetrator-not-
present option. In contrast, participants receiving unbiased instructions
were told that the perpetrator may or may not be present, and their
response sheets included an explicit perpetrator-not-present option.
Malpass and Devine found that biased instructions resulted in more
choosing from the target-absent lineups. Other research followed that
showed that biased instructions resulted in increased choosing of the inno-
cent suspect from target-absent lineups without reducing the rate at which
correct IDs were made from target-present lineups (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, &
Martens, 1987). A meta-analysis by Steblay (1997) concluded in favor of
unbiased instructions.
2.3 Sequential Presentation
Lindsay andWells (1985) were the ﬁrst to compare simultaneous to sequen-
tial lineup presentation. They found that sequential lineups resulted in a
small, nonsigniﬁcant decrease to the correct ID rate (from 0.58 to 0.50),
but a large decrease in the false ID rate (from 0.43 to 0.17). Two experi-
ments by Lindsay and colleagues (Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991; Lindsay,
Lea, Nosworthy, et al., 1991) also found large advantages for sequential
lineup presentation. A meta-analysis by Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, and Lindsay
(2001) appeared to conﬁrm the existence of the sequential superiority
effect.
2.4 Proper Consideration of Conﬁdence
Wells and Bradﬁeld (1998) showed that conﬁrming a participant’s choice
from a lineup led to an inﬂation of conﬁdence in that decision, and an
enhancement of various other aspects of memory for the perpetrator
(e.g., estimating a longer and better view of the perpetrator, more attention
was paid to the perpetrator). Therefore, it was important for law enforce-
ment to get a conﬁdence estimate before eyewitnesses received any
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feedback regarding their choice. But that conﬁdence estimate, even if un-
contaminated by feedback, played a limited role in the reforms. This limited
role stood in contrast to the important role played by conﬁdence as deemed
by the U.S. Supreme Court (Biggers, 1972). Conﬁdence is one of the ﬁve
factors used by the courts to establish the reliability of an eyewitness.
2.5 Double-Blind Lineup Administration
A strong research tradition from psychology and medicine supports the
importance of double-blind testing to control biases and expectations
(e.g., Rosenthal, 1976). Regarding lineups, the rationale for double-blind
lineup administration is to ensure that a lineup administrator can provide
no explicit or implicit guidance regarding who the suspect is. Phillips
McAuliff, Kovera, and Cutler (1999) compared blind and nonblind lineup
administration. They relied on only target-absent lineups, and found that
blind administration reduced false IDs when the lineups were conducted
sequentially, but not simultaneously. The lack of empirical evidence at
the time the reforms were proposed likely explains why double-blind
administration was not among the original reforms. There has been some
research since. Greathouse and Kovera (2009) found that the ratio of guilty
to innocent suspects identiﬁed was greater for blind lineup administrators.
However, Clark, Marshall, and Rosenthal (2009) showed that blind testing
would not solve all the problems of administrator inﬂuence. In sum, there
remains relatively little evidence evaluating the merits of double-blind
lineup administration. Consequently, its status as a reform has more to do
with the historical importance of blind testing in other ﬁelds than the exis-
tence of a deﬁnitive empirical base involving lineup testing.
The story of the eyewitness reforms appeared to be complete at the
dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Yes, honest well-meaning eyewitnesses
could make mistakes, but the adoption of these reforms would reduce
the number of those mistakes and thereby enhance the accuracy of eyewit-
ness evidence. And nearly everyone believed this, from experts in the ﬁeld
(e.g., Kassin et al., 2001), to the criminal justice system (e.g., The Justice
Project, 2007; the Innocence Project), textbook writers (e.g., Goldstein,
2008; Robinson-Riegler & Robinson-Riegler, 2004), lay people (see
Schmechel, O’Toole, Easterly, & Loftus, 2006; Simons & Chabris,
2011), and the media (e.g., Ludlum’s (2005) novel, The Ambler Warning;
Law and Order: SVU (McCreary, Wolf, & Forney, 2009)). An important
standard of proof, a meta-analysis, had been completed for several of the
reforms, conﬁrming the conclusions. However, the narrative surrounding
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these eyewitness reforms, and indeed eyewitness memory in general, has
shifted in important ways in the last decade.
3. IMPACT OF THE REFORMS MISCONSTRUED
Why did support coalesce around the aforementioned set of reforms?
Clark et al. (2014) addressed this question at some length, and the analysis
presented here, built around four fundamental ideas, is similar to that artic-
ulated by Clark et al. The ﬁrst idea is that the ﬁeld focused almost exclusively
on protecting the innocent (the beneﬁt of the reforms), and not the accom-
panying costs (reduced correct IDs of guilty suspects). The second involves
the distinction between response bias (the willingness to make a selection
from a lineup) and discriminability (the ability to discriminate guilty from
innocent suspects). The third idea highlights the role played by the reliance
on performance measures that (1) conﬂated response bias and discriminabil-
ity, or (2) masked the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy. The
ﬁnal idea implicates the role played by theory in the development of a
research area, in this case relative judgment theory (Wells, 1984): The ratio-
nale for the enhanced accuracy of many of the reforms was that the reforms
reduced the likelihood that an eyewitness relied on relative judgments.
3.1 Focus on Beneﬁts, Discount Costs
Eyewitness researchers generally have focused on the beneﬁts of the reforms,
and disregarded the costs. That is, they have emphasized the reduction in the
false IDs of innocent suspects, while downplaying the reduction in correct
IDs of guilty suspects (see Clark, 2012). Due to the failure to appreciate
the difference between discriminability and response bias, and a reliance on
measures that conﬂated these factors (see next two subsections), more conser-
vative (protecting the innocent) became synonymous with better. This focus
on protecting the innocent, coupled with the fact that the reforms generally
induce fewer false IDs, fed the momentum of these reforms across the United
States “like a runaway train,” (G. Wells, quoted by Hansen, 2012).
Of course, reducing the rate of false IDs is a noble goal, and an under-
standable initial reaction to the tragic false convictions of people like Ronald
Cotton (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009), Kirk Bloodsworth
(Junkin, 2004), and too many others (e.g., Garrett, 2011). False convictions
take a terrible toll on the falsely convicted and his or her family. False con-
victions also take a ﬁnancial toll. An investigation by the Better Government
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Association and the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
University School of Law showed that false convictions for violent crimes
cost Illinois taxpayers $214 million (Chicago Sun Times, October 5, 2011).
A recent update estimates that the costs will top $300 million (http://www.
bettergov.org/wrongful_conviction_costs_keep_climbing, April, 2013).
But the narrative surrounding these reforms was distorted by this under-
standable focus on the innocent. For example, Wells et al. (2000, p. 585)
wrote: “Surrounding an innocent suspect in a lineup with dissimilar ﬁllers
increases the risk that the innocent suspect will be identiﬁed (Lindsay &
Wells, 1980).” That is undoubtedly true, but surrounding a guilty suspect
in a lineup with dissimilar ﬁllers also increases the chances that a guilty sus-
pect will be chosen. Both innocent suspect and guilty suspect choosing rates
must be considered. A full understanding of the contribution of factors like
lineup fairness to eyewitness decision making requires consideration of both
sides of the story.
The other side of the story is that if an innocent person is convicted of a
crime, the actual perpetrator remains free and capable of committing more
crimes. The aforementioned Sun Times article also reported on the new
victims that arose from the 14 murders, 11 sexual assaults, 10 kidnappings,
and at least 62 other felonies committed by the actual Illinois perpetrators,
free while innocent men and women served time for these crimes. Similar
occurrences are conceivable if a reform merely induces more conservative
responding, which decreases the rate of false IDs (the beneﬁt) but also
decreases the rate of correct IDs (the cost). The ideal reform would seek
to minimize costs and maximize beneﬁts.
3.2 Discriminability versus Response Bias
An eyewitness ID from a lineup involves a recognition decision. That is, the
options are provided to the eyewitness, who has the choice to select someone
deemed to be the perpetrator, or to reject the lineup if the perpetrator is
deemed not to be present. But because there are a limited number of options
available, it is possible that an eyewitness can be “correct” (choose the suspect)
by chance. For example, if there are ﬁve ﬁllers and one suspect in the lineup,
even someone with no memory for the perpetrator but who nevertheless
makes an ID from the lineup has a one in six chance of picking the suspect.
Consequently, it is important to take into account this “success by chance”
when dealing with recognition memory data, especially because “success
by chance” varies across individuals (and testing situations) due to differences
in the willingness to make a response. An example will make this clear.
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Imagine that students are randomly assigned into one of two groups: a
neutral group or a conservative group. All students take an identical multi-
ple-choice exam, but one in which the students can choose not to respond
to every question. The neutral group is awarded þ1 point for each correct
answer and deducted "1 point for each incorrect answer. The conservative
group receives þ1 point for each correct answer but "10 points for each
incorrect answer. Because the cost of making an error is much greater in
the conservative group, the students in this group will be less likely to answer
a question. Instead, these students will make a response only if they are high-
ly likely to be correct (i.e., highly conﬁdent). They have set a “conservative”
criterion for making a response. As a result of their conservative criterion,
Table 2 reveals that these students have only responded correctly to 48%
of the questions (in this hypothetical example). In contrast, the students in
the neutral group will be more likely to answer the questions because
they are penalized less for an incorrect answer. As a result of their “liberal”
criterion, they have responded correctly to 82% of the questions.
Would it be fair to assign grades (which reﬂect course knowledge) based
on percent correct? No, because the conservative group will be more careful
when responding because the cost of an error is high. This results in fewer
correct answers. But the differential cost of an error affects only the students’
willingness to respond (affecting response bias), not their course knowledge
(not affecting discriminability, which is the ability to distinguish correct
answers from ﬁllers). Note also the corresponding role that conﬁdence plays
in the answers that are offered. The conservative students will only answer
those questions for which they are highly conﬁdent whereas the neutral stu-
dents will be highly conﬁdent in some answers but will answer other ques-
tions (some correctly) despite being less than certain.
In recognition memory, the need to disentangle discriminability from
response bias has long been known (e.g., Banks, 1970; Egan, 1958). The
principal solution to this problem in the recognition memory literature
involves the application of signal-detection theory (SDT) (e.g., Macmillan
& Creelman, 2005). SDT provides a means of separately estimating, from
a hit (correct ID) and false alarm (akin to a false ID) rate, an index of
Table 2 Hypothetical data from the neutral and conservative groups
% Correct Hit rate
False alarm
rate d0 b
Neutral group 82% 0.82 0.14 2.00 0.165
Conservative group 48% 0.48 0.02 2.00 2.108
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discriminability (d0) and a separate index of response bias (i.e., a willingness
to make a response, e.g., b).
The hypothetical data from the neutral and conservative groups are
shown in Table 2. The neutral group has a higher percent correct, hit
rate, and false alarm rate than the conservative group, but d0 is identical.
That means the groups have the same ability to distinguish correct answers
from ﬁllers, but the response bias differs, as reﬂected by the b values (which is
higher for the conservative group). Despite the fact that the need to separate
discriminability and response bias has been known since the 1950s, eyewit-
ness researchers often relied on measures that conﬂated the two, as we shall
see next.
3.3 Measurement Issues
The neutral versus conservative students’ example illustrates that one cannot
simply rely on a direct comparison of correct ID rates (or hit rates) across, for
example, simultaneous versus sequential presentation methods, to determine
which one is superior. Eyewitness researchers recognized this fact, and there-
fore jointly considered correct and false IDs to compute an index of the pro-
bative value of an eyewitness ID. One common probative value measure,
the diagnosticity ratio (Wells & Lindsay, 1980), took the ratio of the correct
ID rate to the false ID rate. If the diagnosticity ratio equals 1.0, it indicates
that the eyewitness evidence has no probative value; a chosen suspect is just
as likely to be innocent as guilty. But as that ratio grows, it signals that the
suspect is increasingly likely to be guilty rather than innocent. It is assumed
that the best lineup presentation method is the one that maximizes the diag-
nosticity ratio, and the reforms were evaluated relying on this (or a related
ratio-based) measure.
3.3.1 Diagnosticity Ratio
As revealed byWixted andMickes (2012), the problem with comparing one
diagnosticity ratio from (for example) simultaneous presentation to one
diagnosticity ratio from sequential presentation is that the diagnosticity ratio
changes as response bias changes. In particular, the diagnosticity ratio
increases as the response bias becomes more conservative. Gronlund,
Carlson, et al. (2012) and Mickes, Flowe, and Wixted (2012) demonstrated
this empirically. Wixted and Mickes (2014) showed how this prediction fol-
lows from SDT; Clark, Erickson, and Breneman (2011) used theWITNESS
model to show the same result. The problem is obvious: If a range of diag-
nosticity ratios can arise from a simultaneous lineup test, which value should
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be used to compare to a sequential lineup test? (Rotello, Heit, and Dubé (in
press) illustrate how similar problems with dependent variables in other
domains have led to erroneous conclusions.) The solution proposed by
Wixted andMickes (2012) was to conduct a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) analysis of eyewitness IDs. ROC analysis traces out discriminability
across all levels of response bias. It is a method widely used in a variety of
diagnostic domains including weather forecasting, materials testing, and
medical imaging (for reviews see Swets, 1988; Swets, Dawes, & Monahan,
2000), and is an analytic (and nonparametric) technique closely tied to SDT.
In the basic cognitive psychology literature, SDT has long been used to
conceptualize the level of conﬁdence associated with a recognition memory
decision. SDT is useful for conceptualizing an eyewitness task because a
lineup is a special type of recognition test, one in which an eyewitness views
a variety of alternatives and then makes a decision to either identify one
person or to reject the lineup. The speciﬁc version of SDT that has most
often been applied to recognition memory is the unequal-variance signal-
detection (UVSD) model (Egan, 1958).
In the context of eyewitness memory, the UVSD model speciﬁes how
the subjective experience of the memory strength of the individuals in the
lineup is distributed across the population of guilty suspects (targets) and
innocent suspects (lures). Assuming the use of fair lineups in which the inno-
cent suspect does not resemble the perpetrator any more than the ﬁllers do,
the lure distribution also represents the ﬁllers in a lineup. The model repre-
sents a large population of possible suspects and ﬁllers (hence the distribu-
tions), although in any individual case there is only one suspect and
(typically) ﬁve ﬁllers in a lineup. According to this model (illustrated in
Figure 1), the mean and standard deviation of the target distribution (the
Memory Strength
Targets
(guilty suspects)
1 2 3
IdentifyDo not
identify
Lures
(innocent suspects)
Figure 1 A depiction of the standard unequal-variance signal-detection model for
three different levels of conﬁdence, low (1), medium (2), and high (3).
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actual perpetrators) are both greater than the corresponding values for the
lure distribution.
A key assumption of SDT is that a decision criterion is placed somewhere
on the memory strength axis, such that an ID is made if the memory strength
of a face (target or lure) exceeds it. The correct ID rate is represented by the
proportion of the target distribution that falls to the right of the decision
criterion, and the false ID rate is represented by the proportion of the lure
distribution that falls to the right of the decision criterion. These theoretical
considerations apply directly to eyewitness’ decisions made using a showup
(i.e., where a single suspect is presented to the eyewitness, for a review see
Neuschatz et al., in press), but they also apply to decisions made from a
lineup once an appropriate decision rule is speciﬁed (Clark et al., 2011;
Fife, Perry, & Gronlund, 2014; Wixted & Mickes, 2014). One simple
rule holds that eyewitnesses ﬁrst determine the individual in the simulta-
neous lineup who most closely resembles their memory for the perpetrator
and then identify that lineup member if the subjective memory strength for
that individual exceeds the decision criterion.
Figure 1 also shows how SDT conceptualizes conﬁdence ratings associ-
ated with IDs made with different degrees of conﬁdence (1 ¼ low conﬁ-
dence, 2 ¼ medium conﬁdence, and 3 ¼ high conﬁdence). Theoretically,
the decision to identify a target or a lure with low conﬁdence is made
when memory strength is high enough to support a conﬁdence rating of
1, but is not high enough to support a conﬁdence rating of 2 (i.e., when
memory strength falls between the ﬁrst and second decision criteria). Simi-
larly, a decision to identify a target or a lure with the next highest level of
conﬁdence is made when memory strength is sufﬁcient to support a conﬁ-
dence rating of at least 2 (but not 3). A high-conﬁdence rating of 3 is made
when memory strength is strong enough to exceed the rightmost criterion.
An ROC curve is constructed by plotting correct IDs as a function of
false IDs. Figure 2 (left-hand panel) depicts an ROC curve based on the
signal-detection model in Figure 1. For the left-hand-most point on the
ROC, the correct ID rate is based on the proportion of the target distribu-
tion that exceeds the high-conﬁdence criterion (3), and the false ID rate is
based on the proportion of the lure distribution that exceeds that same cri-
terion. For the next point on the ROC, the correct ID rate reﬂects the pro-
portion of the target distribution that exceeds the medium-conﬁdence
criterion (2), and the false ID rate is based on the proportion of the lure dis-
tribution that exceeds that same criterion. The correct and false ID rates
continue to accumulate across all the decision criteria, sweeping out a curve
14 Scott D. Gronlund et al.
that displays the discriminability for a given reform as a function of different
response biases. The best performing reform is indicated by the ROC curve
closest to the upper left-hand corner of the space. See Gronlund, Wixted,
and Mickes (2014) for more details about conducting ROC analyses in
lineup studies.
The reliance on measures like the diagnosticity ratio that conﬂate dis-
criminability and response bias led researchers to conclude that some of
the recommended reforms were more accurate than the procedure they
were replacing (Clark et al., 2014). However, as we shall see, several of
the recommended reforms were merely more conservative in terms of
response bias, not more accurate. Moreover, the reliance on measures that
conﬂated discriminability and bias was not the only measurement issue
that led eyewitness researchers astray. The widespread use of an unsuitable
correlation measure also allowed an incorrect conclusion to be reached
regarding the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy.
3.3.2 Point-Biserial Correlation
The relationship between eyewitness conﬁdence in an ID decision and the
accuracy of that decision was evaluated by computing the point-biserial cor-
relation. The point-biserial correlation assesses the degree of relationship
Figure 2 The left-hand panel depicts a receiver operating characteristic curve based on
the signal-detection model in Figure 1. The high-conﬁdence criterion results in a correct
ID rate of 0.37 and a false ID rate of 0.02; the medium-conﬁdence criterion results in a
correct ID rate of the 0.50 and a false ID rate of 0.06; the low-conﬁdence criterion results
in a correct ID rate of 0.63 and a false ID rate of 0.15. The right-hand panel depicts the
calibration curve for the same model using these same response proportions. For a cali-
bration curve, the proportion correct in each conﬁdence category (0.37/(0.37 þ 0.02);
0.13/(0.13 þ 0.04); 0.13/(0.13 þ 0.09)) is plotted as a function of subjective conﬁdence.
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between accuracy, coded as either correct or incorrect, and subjective con-
ﬁdence. Research at the time the reforms were proposed showed a weak to
moderate relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy. Wells and Murray
(1984) found a correlation of only 0.07, although a higher correlation (0.41)
was reported when the focus was on only those individuals who made a
choice from the lineup (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). This
seemingly unimpressive relationship1 between conﬁdence and accuracy
dovetailed nicely with the malleability of conﬁdence demonstrated byWells
and Bradﬁeld (1998). This is why an eyewitness’ assessment of conﬁdence
played little role in the reforms. But that began to change with a report
by Juslin, Olsson, and Winman (1996).
Juslin et al. (1996) argued that eyewitness researchers needed to examine
the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy using calibration curves.
Calibration curves plot the relative frequency of correct IDs as a function of
the different conﬁdence categories (i.e., the subjective probability that the
person chosen is the perpetrator). Figure 2 (right-hand panel) depicts a cali-
bration curve based on the signal-detection model in Figure 1. In contrast to
the construction of ROC curves, where we compute the area in the target
and lure distributions that fall above a conﬁdence criterion, here we take the
areas in the target and lure distributions that fall between adjacent conﬁ-
dence criteria. For example, 13% of the target distribution falls above crite-
rion 1 but below criterion 2, with 9% of the lure distribution falling in that
same range. That means that the accuracy of these low-conﬁdence suspect
IDs is 13/(13 þ 9) or 59%. The accuracy is higher for those suspect IDs
that fall between criteria 2 and 3, 13% of the target distribution and 4% of
the lure distribution, making the accuracy 77% (13/(13 þ 4)). Finally, the
accuracy is higher still for the highest conﬁdence suspect IDs, those that
fall above criterion 3 (95% ¼ 37/(37 þ 2)).
Juslin et al. (their Figure 1) showed that the point-biserial correlation
masked the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy. To illustrate
the point, they simulated data that exhibited perfect calibration; perfect cali-
bration implies that (for example) participants that are 70% certain of a cor-
rect ID have 70% correct IDs. But by varying the distribution of responses
across the conﬁdence categories, Juslin et al. showed that the point-biserial
1 Although r is not the best statistic for evaluating the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy,
r ¼ 0.41 actually signals a strong relationship. The ﬁrst clinical trial for a successful AIDS drug was so
successful that the research was halted so that the control group could also get the drug: r ¼ 0.28 was
the effect size (Barnes, 1986).
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correlation could vary from 0 to 1 despite perfect calibration. More recent
efforts (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006) using calibration show a much stronger
relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy than was understood at the
time the reforms were proposed. We shall return to the implications of
this ﬁnding.
The reliance on measures that conﬂated discriminability and response
bias, or masked the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy, was
major contributor to how the impact of the eyewitness reforms came to
be misconstrued. Another major contributor was the role of a theory devel-
oped in response to the initial empirical tests of the reforms.
3.4 Role of Theory
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that
you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to
solve
Popper (1972).
Theory is vital to the evolution of a science. Theories are testable; they
organize data, help one to conceptualize why the data exhibit the patterns
they do, and point to new predictions that can be tested. However, theory
also can distort data through conﬁrmation biases, publication biases, and
selective reporting (see Clark et al., 2014; Ioannidis, 2008; Simmons,
Simonsohn, & Nelson, 2011). We believe that this distorting effect of the-
ory is especially likely when two conditions are met. First, a theory has
the potential to distort when it is not formally speciﬁed. It is difﬁcult to
extract deﬁnitive predictions from verbally speciﬁed theories (Bjork,
1973; Lewandowsky, 1993) because the lack of formalism makes the work-
ings of the model vague and too ﬂexible. A formally speciﬁed theory, on
the other hand, forces a theoretician to be explicit (and complete) about
the assumptions that are made, which make transparent the reasons for
its predictions, and provides a check on the biases of reasoning (Hintzman,
1991). Second, a theory has the potential to distort when it has no compet-
itors (Jewett, 2005; Platt, 1964). Such was the state of the ﬁeld of eyewit-
ness memory at the time of the reforms.
Relative judgment theory has been the organizing theory for eyewitness
memory for 30 years (Wells, 1984, 1993). Wells proposed that faulty
eyewitness decisions largely arose from a reliance on relative judgments.
Relative judgments involve choosing the individual from the lineup who
looks most like (is the best match to) the memory of the perpetrator relative
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to the other individuals in the lineup. An extreme version of relative judg-
ment theory would have an eyewitness choosing someone from every
lineup, but that is not what happens. Instead, a decision criterion is needed
to determine if the best-matching individual from a lineup should be chosen
or whether the lineup should be rejected. Wells contrasted relative judg-
ments with absolute judgments. Absolute judgments involve determining
how well each individual in the lineup matches memory for the perpetrator,
and results in choosing the best-matching individual if its match strength
exceeds a decision criterion. Absolute judgments are assumed to entail no
contribution from the other lineup members.
In addition to the absolute-relative dichotomy, comparable dichotomies
posited other “reliable versus unreliable” contributors to eyewitness deci-
sions (see also Clark & Gronlund, 2015). One dichotomy was automatic
versus deliberative processes (Charman & Wells, 2007; Dunning & Stern,
1994); a deliberative strategy (e.g., a process of elimination) was deemed
inferior to automatic detection (“his face popped out at me”). A second
dichotomy involved true recognition versus guessing (Steblay, Dysart, &
Wells, 2011). The additional correct IDs that arose from use of the nonre-
form procedure were deemed “lucky guesses” and therefore should be
discounted because they were accompanied by additional false IDs. Irrespec-
tive of the dichotomy, the reforms were thought to be beneﬁcial because
they reduced reliance on these unreliable contributions. In what follows,
we focus on the relative versus absolute dichotomy, although the arguments
we make apply equally to the other dichotomies.
The initial version of relative judgment theory led people to believe that
a reliance on absolute judgments reduced false IDs but not correct IDs. The
ﬁrst studies conducted comparing the reforms to the existing procedures
reported data consistent with this outcome. The four reforms reviewed by
Clark et al. (2014)dlineup instructions, lineup presentation, ﬁller similarity,
and ﬁller selection2dshowed an average gain in correct IDs for the reforms
of 8%, and an average decrease in false IDs for the reforms of 19%. There
apparently was no cost to the reforms in terms of reduced correct IDs,
and a clear beneﬁt in terms of reduced false IDs. Clark (2012) called this
the no-cost view; Clark and Gronlund (2015) referred to it as the strong
version of relative judgment theory’s accuracy claim. In other words, the
2 Granted, description-matched ﬁller selection was designed to increase the correct ID rate relative to
suspect-matched ﬁller selection, so the increase in the correct ID rate should not be viewed as
surprising for that reform.
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shift from relative to absolute judgments reduces false ID rates but has little
effect on correct ID rates, thereby producing a “no-cost” accuracy increase.
This was the version of relative judgment theory in place at the time the
reforms were enacted. An SDT alternative would intuitively predict a
trade-off between costs and beneﬁts arising from these reforms. But because
the reforms appeared to increase accuracy rather than engender a criterion
shift, a signal-detection-based alternative explanation failed to materialize
as a competitor theory.
Most scientiﬁc theories evolve as challenging data begin to accumulate,
but principled modiﬁcations need to be clearly stated and the resulting pre-
dictions transparent. However, this may not be the case when a verbally
speciﬁed theory is guiding research. As conﬂicting evidence began to accu-
mulate contrary to the strong version (see summary by Clark, 2012), a weak
version arose that claimed that the proportional decrease in false IDs is
greater than the proportional decrease in correct IDs. But without a clear
operationalization of how the model worked, it was not clear whether
this was really what relative judgment theory had predicted all along (Clark
et al., 2011). We suspect that if this trade-off was acknowledged sooner, an
SDT alternative might have challenged the widespread acceptance of rela-
tive judgment theory. The following example makes clear the role a
competitor theory can play in interpreting data.
One of the major sources of empirical support for relative judgment the-
ory came from an experiment by Wells (1993). Participants viewed a staged
crime, and then were randomly assigned to view either a 6-person target-
present lineup or a 5-person target-removed lineup. The target-present
lineup contained the guilty suspect and ﬁve ﬁllers; the target-removed
lineup included only the ﬁve ﬁllers. In the target-present lineup, 54% of
the participants chose the guilty suspect and 21% rejected the lineup.
According to the logic of relative judgment theory, if participants are relying
on absolute judgments when they make eyewitness decisions, approximately
75% of the participants should have rejected the target-removed lineup: the
54% that could have identiﬁed the guilty suspect if he had been present, plus
the 21% that would even reject the lineup that included the guilty suspect.
But instead, in apparent support for the contention that eyewitnesses rely on
relative judgments, most target-removed participants selected a ﬁller (the
next-best option). The target-removed rejection rate was only 32%, not
75%. This ﬁnding is considered by many (Greene & Heilbrun, 2011; Steblay
& Loftus, 2013; Wells et al., 1998) to offer strong support for the fact that
eyewitnesses rely on relative judgments.
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Although this result is intuitively compelling, it is difﬁcult to deﬁnitively
evaluate the predictions because the predictions arose from a verbally spec-
iﬁed model. There are many examples of this in the wider literature. To take
one example from the categorization literature: Do we summarize our
knowledge about a category (e.g., birds) by storing in memory a summary
prototype that captures most of the characteristics shared by most of the
category members, or do we instead store all the category examples we
experience? Posner and Keele (1970) showed that participants responded
to a category prototype more strongly than to a speciﬁc exemplar from
the category, even if the prototype had never before been experienced.
This was thought to demonstrate strong evidence for the psychological
reality of prototypes as underlying categorization decisions. But Hintzman
(1986) took a formally speciﬁed memory model that stored only exemplars
and reproduced the same performance advantage for the test of a prototype.
The model accomplished this because it made decisions by matching a test
item to everything in memory. Although a prototype matches nothing
exactly, as the “average” stimulus, it closely matches everything resulting
in a strong response from memory.
Clark and Gronlund (2015) applied a version of the WITNESS model
(Clark, 2003) to Wells’ (1993) target-removed data. The WITNESS model
is a formally speciﬁed model of eyewitness decision making, and one that has
an SDT foundation. Consequently, the model can provide deﬁnitive pre-
dictions, as well as serve as a competitor to relative judgment theory. Clark
and Gronlund implemented a version of WITNESS that makes absolute
judgments (compares a lineup member to criterion and chooses that lineup
member if the criterion is exceeded). They showed that the model could
closely approximate the Wells’ data. This is unexpected given that these
data are regarded as providing deﬁnitive evidence of the reliance on relative
judgments. Moreover, a formal model reveals an explanation for the data
that a verbally speciﬁed theory often cannot. Assume that there are two
lineup alternatives above criterion in the target-present lineup. One of those
typically is the target, and the other we refer to as the next-best. Because the
target, on average, will match memory for the perpetrator better than the
next-best, the target is frequently chosen. But it is clear that by moving
that same lineup into the target-removed condition (sans the target), the
same decision criterion results in the choosing of the next-best option.
That is, the “target-to-ﬁller-shift” thought indicative of a reliance of relative
judgments may signal nothing of the sort. This raises questions about the
empirical support favoring relative judgment theory.
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Clark et al. (2011) undertook an extensive exploration of relative and ab-
solute judgments in theWITNESS model to seek theoretical support for the
superiority of absolute judgments. They explored the parameter space
widely for both description-matched (same ﬁllers in target-present and
target-absent lineups) and suspect-matched (different ﬁllers in target-present
and target-absent lineups). They found that relative versus absolute judg-
ments made little difference for description-matched lineups in many
circumstances (see also Goodsell, Gronlund, & Carlson, 2010); some cir-
cumstances exhibited a slight relative judgment advantage. In contrast, the
suspect-matched lineups showed a more robust absolute judgment advan-
tage. Here was the theoretical support for the predictions of relative judg-
ment theory; a reliance on absolute judgments did enhance performance
for the types of lineups that the police typically construct.
But Fife et al. (2014) limited the scope of this ﬁnding. They showed that
the WITNESS model parameters that govern the proportional contribu-
tions of relative versus absolute judgments covary with the decision crite-
rion. That means that the model typically is unable to uniquely identify
the proportion of relative versus absolute judgment contribution given
only ID data. Figure 3 shows three ROC curves generated by theWITNESS
model for the largest absolute judgment advantage reported by Clark et al.
(2011). Although there is a detectable difference between a 100% relative
and 0% relative judgment rule, there is little difference between a 0% relative
rule and a 75% relative rule. This is not strong evidence for the superiority of
absolute judgments if a model that is predominantly relative (75%) is very
similar to one that is absolute (0% relative). At the present time, both the
empirical and the theoretical support for the predictions of relative judgment
theory are unsettled. Indeed, Wixted and Mickes (2014) suggested that
comparisons among lineup members (a form of relative judgment) actually
facilitate the ability of eyewitnesses to discriminate innocent versus guilty
suspects.
Fully understanding the theoretical contributions of relative versus abso-
lute judgments to eyewitness ID decision making will require more work.
The aforementioned parameter trade-off may not arise if relative-absolute
judgments are instantiated differently in the WITNESS model, or if addi-
tional data like conﬁdence or reaction times are considered. Moreover, as
Clark et al. (2011) noted, the empirical evaluation of these predictions
also is complicated by a number of factors. For example, it is unlikely that
any experimental manipulation would be so strong that all of the participants
in one condition would use a pure absolute judgment strategy and all of
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the participants in the other condition would use a pure relative judgment
strategy. To the extent that the manipulation is not 100% successful, or
that participants use a mixed strategy, the differences might be difﬁcult to
detect empirically.
A theory can abet confusion within a research area in several ways. It can
engender conﬁrmation biases. For instance, in a meta-analysis comparing
simultaneous and sequential lineups, Steblay et al. (2011) reported that
the sequential lineup produced a 22% decrease in the false IDs compared
to the simultaneous lineup, compared to only an 8% decrease in correct
IDs arising from sequential lineups. (Clark (2012) reported other problems
with this meta-analysis.) This result ostensibly signals clear support for the
sequential lineup reform. But the 22% value was misleading because it arose
from a failure to distinguish between ﬁller IDs and false IDs. For studies that
do not designate an innocent suspect, researchers typically estimate a false
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Figure 3 Three receiver operating characteristic curves generated by the WITNESS
model for the largest absolute judgment advantage reported by Clark et al. (2011).
Although there is a difference between a 100% relative and 0% relative judgment
rule, there is little difference between a 0% relative rule (i.e., an absolute rule) and a
75% relative rule. Figure modiﬁed with kind permission from Springer Science and Busi-
ness Media, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, (2014), 21, 479e487, Revisiting absolute and
relative judgments in the WITNESS model., Fife, D., Perry, C., & Gronlund, S. D., Figure 4.
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ID rate by dividing the choosing rate by the number of ﬁllers. Once
the correction is made, the estimated decrease in the false ID rate resulting
from sequential lineups is only 4% (Clark et al., 2014). Steblay (1997) made
a similar error regarding the effectiveness of unbiased lineup instructions.
A theory also can induce publication biases. Clark et al. (2014) reported
evidence of this in the Steblay et al. (2011) simultaneous-sequential meta-
analysis. The unpublished studies reported by Steblay et al. showed a trade-
off between costs (reduced correct IDs in sequential) and beneﬁts (reduced
false IDs in sequential). However, the studies that were published during
this same period indicated that the beneﬁts of sequential lineups outweighed
the costs. In other words, the unpublished data supported a conservative cri-
terion shift arising from sequential lineups, not a discriminability advantage.
4. REEVALUATION OF THE REFORMS
The narrative surrounding the reforms has changed in the last decade.
The data have changed, shifting from showing the beneﬁts of the reforms to
showing that the reforms often produce a conservative criterion shift, not an
improvement in discriminability. It took a while for researchers to sort this
out for the reasons discussed above: an almost exclusive focus on protecting
the potentially innocent suspect, reliance on measures that conﬂated dis-
criminability and response bias, and the distorting role of relative judgment
theory. In this next section, we assess the current state of the reforms, exam-
ining the recent data, the implications of the development of competing
theories, and the broader implications of more clearly assessing the relation-
ship between conﬁdence and accuracy. We begin with a current view of the
empirical data.
4.1 Decline Effects
Clark et al. (2014) examined the evolution of the empirical ﬁndings
regarding four of the reforms from the time of the initial studies through
to those studies published by 2011. The reforms were: ﬁller similarity, ﬁller
selection, lineup instructions, and lineup presentation. Recall that the com-
parison for ﬁller similarity involves less versus more similar ﬁllers; the com-
parison for ﬁller selection involves suspect- versus description-matched
ﬁllers; the comparison for lineup instructions is between biased and unbiased
instructions; and the comparison for lineup presentation is between simulta-
neous and sequential.
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As Clark et al. (2014) reported, and we noted above, the ﬁrst studies that
made the comparisons between the initial procedures and the recommended
reforms (ﬁller similaritydLindsay & Wells, 1980; ﬁller selectiondWells
et al., 1993; lineup instructionsdMalpass & Devine, 1981; lineup presenta-
tiondLindsay & Wells, 1985) resulted in data that exhibited no costs and
large beneﬁts. But Clark et al. showed that, when viewed in the context
of the data that followed, those results were outliers. For example, they
compared the d0 difference between the recommended and the nonrecom-
mended procedures. The average d0 advantage favoring the reforms for these
initial studies was 0.81. But the average d0 difference for an aggregate of all
studies was "0.02. Clark et al. also completed another assessment of the
representativeness of the initial studies, determining what proportion of
studies had results less extreme than the results of the initial studies. For
the d0 comparisons, those proportions were 0.91, 0.97, 0.89, and 0.87, for
ﬁller similarity, ﬁller selection, lineup instructions, and lineup presentation,
respectively. These initial studies were not poorly conducted, but in hind-
sight it is clear that their results were unrepresentative, and too inﬂuential.
Table 3 provides a summary of the current view of these eyewitness reforms.
The discriminability beneﬁt of the reforms reported in the initial studies
did not withstand the test of replication. Ioannidis (2008; Schooler, 2011)
calls these decline effects. Decline effects are not unique to psychology, and
there are many factors that contribute including publication bias and the
ﬁle-drawer problem, a bias toward publishing positive results (not null
effects), the biasing effect of initial studies, and the distorting role of theory.
The data as they stand today provide no support for these four reforms if the
criterion for success is increased accuracy (i.e., discriminability). A report
Table 3 Current understanding of the impact of these eyewitness reforms
Reform Current view
Fair ﬁllers Induces more conservative responding but no change
to discriminability
Description-matched ﬁllers Induces more conservative responding but no change
to discriminability
Unbiased instructions Induces more conservative responding but no change
to discriminability
Sequential presentation Induces more conservative responding but reduces
discriminability
Role for initial conﬁdence Initial eyewitness conﬁdence is meaningfully related
to eyewitness accuracy
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released by the National Academy of Sciences in October, 2014 (Identifying
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identiﬁcation), stated “The committee con-
cludes that there should be no debate about the value of greater discrimina-
bilitye to promote a lineup procedure that yields less discriminability would
be akin to advocating that the lineup be performed in dim instead of bright
light,” p. 80.
4.2 Alternative Theoretical Formulations
Relative judgment theory dominated the eyewitness literature for 30 years,
and the time has come to consider alternative theoretical formulations. Here
we consider three: a signal-detection-based theory, the question of whether
eyewitness memory is mediated by discrete processes or a continuous under-
lying substrate, and consideration of the role recollection might play in
eyewitness decision making.
4.2.1 Signal-Detection Alternative
Relative judgment theory purported to explain how the recommended
reforms reduced reliance on relative judgments and encouraged reliance
on absolute judgments. It claimed to describe how it was that correct IDs
were little affected by these reforms, but false IDs would decrease. As
mentioned above, no theoretical alternative arose to challenge relative judg-
ment theory. But in light of the results reported by Clark et al. (2014), an
alternative theoretical approach is needed. Moreover, calls have been
made for that theory to be formally speciﬁed (e.g., Clark, 2008). Clark’s
(2003; Clark et al., 2011) WITNESS model was the ﬁrst signal-detection-
based theory to answer that call (Clark et al., 2011). Recently, Wixted
and Mickes (2014) proposed an alternative theoretical implementation.
We consider the Wixted and Mickes theory here because it explicitly
addresses ideas that have been raised in this chapter, including the need
for ROC analysis of lineup data, and, due to its grounding in SDT, the
strong positive relationship between eyewitness conﬁdence and accuracy.
The theory, embedded in an UVSD framework, is depicted in Figure 1.
One of the things that makes the theory beneﬁcial is the way in which it can
enhance our understanding of relative judgment theory. For example,
Wixted and Mickes (2014) illustrated that the diagnosticity ratio increases
as response bias becomes more conservative. We can illustrate the same thing
using the criteria depicted in Figure 1. For the distributions depicted, the
correct and false ID rates for the most liberal criterion (1) are 0.63 and
0.15, making the diagnosticity ratio equal to 4.2 (0.63/0.15). Recall that
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the correct ID rate is based on the proportion of the target distribution that
lies above criterion 1; the false ID rate is based on the proportion of the lure
distribution that lies above criterion 1. For the more conservative criterion 2,
the correct and false ID rates are 0.50 and 0.06, and the diagnosticity ratio
increases to 8.3. For the even more conservative criterion 3, the correct
and false ID rates are 0.37 and 0.02 and the diagnosticity ratio even greater
at 18.5. We can bookend these values by selecting the most liberal criterion
setting at the far left tails of the distributions, which would result in correct
and false ID rates of essentially 1.0 and 1.0 and a diagnosticity ratio of
approximately 1.0. At the other extreme, we can set the criterion far out
in the right-hand tail of the target distribution, where the false ID rate
becomes vanishingly small (e.g., 0.001), greatly increasing the diagnosticity
ratio (>50). Note that the diagnosticity ratio varies over this wide range
despite the discriminability, by deﬁnition, not changing. For a more detailed
treatment of why the diagnosticity ratio and response bias are related in this
manner, see the Appendix in Wixted and Mickes. For empirical conﬁrma-
tion, see Gronlund, Carlson, et al. (2012) and Mickes et al. (2012). In sum,
viewed through an SDT framework, it is clear why the diagnosticity ratio is
an inappropriate measure for evaluating reforms that induce changes in
response biases. Moreover, it underscores the necessity for ROC analysis
to assess these reforms.
4.2.2 Continuous or Discrete Mediation
The UVSD model assumes that continuous latent memory strengths
mediate recognition judgments. The memory strengths could arise from a
familiarity process (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984), or as the sum of familiar-
ity and a graded recollection signal (Wixted & Mickes, 2010), or as a match
value representing the similarity of the test face to the memory of the perpe-
trator (Clark, 2003). A face in the lineup is matched to memory and the
resulting memory signal is compared to a decision criterion. A positive
response is made if the memory signal exceeds criterion, otherwise a nega-
tive response is made. If the test face had been studied previously, the
response would be classiﬁed a hit (a correct ID), but if the test face had
not been studied previously, the response would be classiﬁed as a false alarm
(a false ID). The continuous evidence that mediates recognition judgments
in the UVSD model can be contrasted with the discrete mediation posited
by Wells and colleagues.
Wells, Steblay, and Dysart (2012; Steblay et al., 2011) proposed that,
in addition to the reforms purportedly increasing the likelihood that
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eyewitnesses rely on absolute judgments, they also implicitly posited that
discrete processes mediated recognition memory in eyewitness ID. They
called the two processes (among other labels) “true recognition” and “guess-
ing.”Wells and colleagues assumed that if a face in a lineup is the perpetrator,
there are two paths by which that face could be identiﬁed. One path relies on
a detection process (many would equate detection with recollection, e.g., see
Yonelinas, 1994). If the perpetrator is detected, he is positively identiﬁed
with high conﬁdence. Wells et al. referred to this as a legitimate hit. However,
if the detect process fails, an eyewitness can still make a guess and select the
perpetrator with a 1/n chance (where n is the size of the lineup). (If the lineup
is biased, the likelihood of guessing the perpetrator could be greater than
1/n.) Wells et al. referred to this as an illegitimate hit. The idea of the reforms
was that it would reduce eyewitnesses’ reliance on guessing (reduce illegiti-
mate hits) and move them toward judgments based on true recognition
(legitimate hits). Wells and colleagues’ idea revisits the debate between
discrete-state and continuous signal-detection-based models from the basic
recognition memory literature (for a review see Egan, 1975; Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005; Pazzaglia, Dubé, & Rotello, 2013).
The operation of recognition memory as described by Wells and col-
leagues is reminiscent of a single high-threshold recognition memory theory
(Swets, 1961). For example, take the perpetrator from the target-present
lineup. The assumption is that participants respond from one of two cogni-
tive states, detect or nondetect. One probability governs the likelihood of
detecting the perpetrator, and with the complementary probability partici-
pants enter the nondetect state, a state from which they make a guess. If the
lineup is fair, the probability of guessing the perpetrator is 1/n.
The standard testing grounds for these two classes of models in the recog-
nition memory literature has been the shape of ROC curves (Green &
Swets, 1966). Discrete-state models predict linear ROC functions; contin-
uous evidence models generally predict curvilinear ROC functions. The
data generally are consistent with continuous evidence models (Pazzaglia
et al., 2013). But recently, discrete-state models have been proposed that
relax assumptions regarding how detect states are mapped onto response cat-
egories (Province & Rouder, 2012), allowing discrete-state models to pro-
duce curvilinear ROC functions. Alternative means of testing between these
classes of models are being developed (e.g., Rouder, Province, Swagman, &
Thiele, under review). Kellen and Klauer (2014) developed one such alter-
native. They had participants study lists of words, and varied the strength of
these words by having some studied once (weak) and some studied three
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times (strong). At test, sets of four words were presented, each set containing
one previously studied word and three previously unstudied words. The
participants ranked each word in the set from most-to-least likely to have
been studied before. The key statistic to be computed is the conditional
probability that a previously studied word would be ranked second given
that it had not been ranked ﬁrst. According to SDT, this conditional prob-
ability should increase as memory strength increases. In contrast, the
discrete-state model predicts that the conditional probability should remain
constant as memory strength increases. Kellen and Klauer showed that the
conditional probability was greater for the strong memory tests, consistent
with SDT and supporting the claim that continuous evidence mediates
recognition memory. Work is underway utilizing this new paradigm in an
eyewitness context to pit the UVSD and the true recognition accounts
against one another.
4.2.3 Role for Recollection
The role that recollection might play in eyewitness ID needs to be explored
further. Gronlund (2005) proposed a dual-process account for why sequen-
tial presentation could result in superior performance in some circum-
stances. Gronlund (2004) had participants study the heights of pairs of
men and women depicted in photographs. Height information was pre-
sented either as the actual height (the man is 50800) or in a comparative
manner (the man is taller than the woman). Recognition testing involved
either the sequential or simultaneous presentation of different height
options. Performance was especially good in the comparative height condi-
tion when the height of the man and woman was equal (man ¼ woman).
Speciﬁcally, when participants studied a man ¼ woman pair, but the
sequential presentation of the test options did not include that option, par-
ticipants correctly rejected the test at very high rates. Gronlund (2005) pro-
posed a dual-process explanation for these data, positing special encoding
for the man¼woman stimulus due to its distinctive status (Healy, Fendrich,
Cunningham, & Till, 1987). Furthermore, because research has shown a
tight coupling of distinctiveness and recollection (e.g., Dobbins, Kroll,
Yonelinas, & Yui, 1998; Hunt, 2003; M€antyl€a, 1997), Gronlund (2005)
proposed that recollection was responsible for retrieving this distinctive
information, and that recollection was more likely given sequential presen-
tation. The consideration of multiple options in a simultaneous test could
stretch limited cognitive resources that otherwise could be used to support
recollection (e.g., Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996).
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Carlson and Gronlund (2011) found support for a contribution of recol-
lection using a face recognition paradigm. They varied perpetrator distinc-
tiveness and sequential or simultaneous testing, and had participants make
ID decisions and remember-know-guess (RKG) judgments (Gardiner &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). They found evidence for the greater use of
recollection (a recall-to-reject strategy, Rotello, 2001) in target-absent
sequential lineups. But Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, and MacLin (2005)
used a multiple-lineup paradigm and found no evidence of a greater reliance
on recollection arising from sequential lineups. Finally, Palmer, Brewer,
McKinnon, and Weber (2010) had participants view a mock crime and
make ID decisions accompanied by RKG judgments and recollection ratings
(which assessed graded recollection, e.g., Wixted, 2007). They found that
correct IDs accompanied by a “remember” report were more accurate
than those accompanied by a “know” report, but that beneﬁt was redundant
with the contribution of response conﬁdence (an effect recently replicated
by Mickes, in press). However, they found that they could better diagnose
eyewitness accuracy by taking graded recollection ratings into account, even
after ID conﬁdence was considered.
Now that the inﬂuence of relative judgment theory is waning, there is
much to be done theoretically to enrich our understanding of eyewitness
decision making. It is vital to have a competitor theory, and that now exists
(Clark, 2003; Wixted & Mickes, 2014). Moreover, these new theories are
speciﬁed formally, which facilitates empirical and theoretical development.
Next, the correspondence between true recognition/guessing and the single
high-threshold model, allows Wells and colleagues’ (Steblay et al., 2011;
Wells et al., 2012) conjecture to be pitted against SDTs and subjected to
empirical tests. Finally, dual-process conceptions of recognition involving
either all-or-none or graded recollection contributions need to be explored.
The next step in the evolution of the eyewitness reforms must be driven by
theory, an idea upon which we will expand in Section 5.
4.3 Role for Conﬁdence
The consensus at the time of the reforms, a view still widely held today (see
Lacy & Stark, 2013), is that eyewitness conﬁdence is not reliably related to ID
accuracy. Krug (2007) reported that the conﬁdenceeaccuracy relationship is
“relatively weak or nonexistent.” Moreover, conﬁdence can be inﬂated by
conﬁrming feedback (e.g., Wells & Bradﬁeld, 1998). In light of these conclu-
sions, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled (Henderson, 2011) that if a
defendant can show that suggestive police procedures may have inﬂuenced
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an eyewitness, but the judge nevertheless allows the eyewitness to testify,
jurors will be instructed that eyewitness conﬁdence is generally an unreliable
indicator of accuracy (p. 5, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/
jury_instruction.pdf). Nevertheless, jurors ﬁnd high-conﬁdence eyewitnesses
to be very compelling (Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988), and the U.S.
Supreme Court (Biggers, 1972) points to eyewitness conﬁdence as one of
the factors a judge should weigh to determine if an ID is reliable.
A signal-detection framework predicts a meaningful relationship bet-
ween conﬁdence and accuracy (Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011),
and presenting the data as a calibration curve, as illustrated in the right-
hand panel of Figure 2, best reveals this relationship. Recent data (e.g.,
Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013) have supported the existence
of this meaningful relationship. However, it is important to note that a
meaningful relationship only holds for the conﬁdence reported by an
eyewitness at his or her initial ID attempt, before any conﬁrming feedback
is delivered and before any additional time has passed.
The existence of a meaningful conﬁdenceeaccuracy relationship for an
eyewitness’ initial choice from a lineup changes the narrative surrounding
eyewitness memory. It suggests that there is more to learn from an eyewit-
ness report than has often been acknowledged. In light of these develop-
ments, Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, and Roediger (in press) argued
that jurors should weigh the conﬁdence reported by an eyewitness during
the initial ID. In other words, an ID accompanied by a conﬁdence report
of 95% is more likely to be correct than an ID accompanied by a conﬁdence
report of 60%. Of course, this does not imply that an eyewitness who is
100% conﬁdent is 100% accurate, but it does imply that an eyewitness
who is 100% conﬁdent is (on average) much more likely to be accurate
than one that is 60% conﬁdent. But more work remains to be done on a
variety of issues involving conﬁdence judgments, including how different
eyewitnesses use the same scale, should eyewitnesses state their degree of
conﬁdence using their own words or a numeric scale, what scale is best to
use, and how do the police decipher and interpret these conﬁdence judg-
ments (see Dodson & Dobolyi, in press).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the potential of a reliance on
initial conﬁdence comes from Garrett’s (2011) analysis of 161 of the DNA
exoneration cases in which faulty eyewitness evidence played a role. In
57% of these cases (92 out of 161), the eyewitnesses reported they had not
been certain at the time of the initial ID. If this low conﬁdence (or zero con-
ﬁdence for those eyewitnesses that initially selected a ﬁller or rejected the
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lineup) was taken seriously, these innocent individuals might never have
been indicted and, consequently, never falsely convicted. However, if the
criminal justice system is going to rely on eyewitness conﬁdence, it provides
important motivation for conducting double-blind lineup testing to elimi-
nate feedback that could taint the initial conﬁdence report.
The development of new theory has cast relative judgment theory and the
reforms in a new light. A signal-detection-based theory is consistent with the
empirical results as they currently stand. This includes the meaningful rela-
tionship between initial conﬁdence and accuracy. Also, three of the reforms
(ﬁller similarity, ﬁller selection, unbiased instructions) can be understood as
inducing a conservative criterion shift. In contrast, sequential presentation
actually reduces discriminability (Carlson & Carlson, 2014; Dobolyi &
Dodson, 2013; Mickes et al., 2012). How does new theory address that result?
Wixted and Mickes (2014; see also Goodsell et al., 2010) proposed a diag-
nostic-feature-detection hypothesis to explain the reduced discriminability of
sequential lineup presentation. Discriminability from simultaneous lineups is
superior because, by seeing all the options at once, eyewitnesses can deter-
mine what features to pay attention to and what features are redundant and
therefore not diagnostic. For example, if all the individuals in the lineup
are young Hispanic males with shaved heads, putting attention on any of
those cues will not help discriminate the lineup members. Generally speaking,
focusing on shared (i.e., nondiagnostic) features will not help eyewitness to
distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects. Rather, eyewitnesses
must attend to the diagnostic cues that will differentiate the perpetrator
from the ﬁllersdand from innocent suspects. Eyewitnesses viewing a sequen-
tial lineup can engage in the same type of sorting of nondiagnostic from diag-
nostic cues as the lineup unfolds. After viewing the second young bald
Hispanic male, eyewitness can shift attention to other cues. Consequently,
discrimination is predicted to be superior when the suspect (guilty or inno-
cent) is placed later in the sequential lineup. This is what Carlson, Gronlund,
and Clark (2008) and Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, and Goodsell (2009) have
found. Clearly, new theory can point to new avenues for exploration, the
proposed reliance on initial eyewitness conﬁdence being the ﬁrst such avenue.
5. FOUNDATION FOR NEXT-GENERATION REFORMS
The next generation of reforms must be grounded in theory (see also
McQuiston-Surrett, Tredoux, & Malpass, 2006). An explanation for how
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and why a reform does what it claims provides a foundation for making
inferences about how the reform will perform in other situations. One crit-
icism of the application of psychological research to real criminal cases is that
the conclusions reached in the lab do not exactly match, or are not entirely
germane, to real world cases (Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979). How does one
determine if the circumstances surrounding the particular crime under
discussion, given this particular eyewitness, and this particular lineup, sufﬁ-
ciently resemble the circumstances surrounding the experiment being dis-
cussed? Of course, that goal can never be attained, because all possible
experiments can never be conducted. However, the answer that can be pro-
vided is to develop theory that seeks to understand how various empirical
circumstances affect a reform.
5.1 Theory-Driven Research
Hugo M€unsterberg (1908) typically gets the credit for conducting the ﬁrst
experimental research directed at integrating psychology and the law. Mun-
sterberg wrote about a number of factors that can change a trial’s outcome,
including faulty eyewitness ID and untrue confessions. But Munsterberg also
is relevant to the argument we have made regarding how the ﬁeld reached
the wrong conclusions regarding some of the reforms. For that purpose, it is
helpful to contrast Munsterberg with one of his contemporaries, Arnold
(1906; cited in Bornstein & Penrod, 2008). Munsterberg and Arnold took
different approaches to the examination of eyewitness memory. Munster-
berg took an applied approach to the problem, and made frequent use of
examples and anecdotes, but Arnold saw value in theory. Arnold was con-
cerned about processes and general principles of memory. Munsterberg’s
approach carried the day in psychology and law research, and a focus on
phenomena, cases, and applications, was to the detriment of research prog-
ress in the ﬁeld. We are not the ﬁrst to make this appraisal (Lane &Meissner,
2008).
Eyewitness research needs to be conducted in concert with the develop-
ment and evaluation of theory. However, theory testing will require con-
ducting different kinds of experiments than have been the norm. Theory
testing will require a shift from maximizing the external validity and realism
of the studies, to a focus on internal validity and the underlying psycholog-
ical processes that operate to produce various phenomena. This will neces-
sitate experiments that generate more than one observation per participant.
For example, Meissner et al. (2005) used a multiple-lineup paradigm to eval-
uate the contributions of recollection and familiarity in simultaneous and
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sequential lineups. Participants studied eight faces in succession, and then
were tested using 16 lineups (a target-present and a target-absent lineup
for each studied face). To test theory, we often need to analyze performance
at the level of the individual rather than at the level of the group. Of course,
highly controlled laboratory experiments are not going to be sufﬁcient.
Once hypotheses are developed and evaluated in these controlled settings,
it will be important to verify that the conclusions scale-up to more realistic
situations. But eyewitness researchers must add highly controlled experi-
ments that seek to test theory as a complement to the more realistic exper-
iments that have dominated the literature to date.
Theory development and testing in eyewitness memory will also
require consideration of additional dependent variables. Right now, data
from eyewitness experiments are sparse, often consisting of only response
proportions for suspect IDs, ﬁller IDs, and rejections. Reaction time data
play a large role in theory development and testing in the broader cogni-
tive literature (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Starns, 2009).
There has been some consideration of reaction time data in the eyewitness
literature (e.g., Brewer, Caon, Todd, & Weber, 2006), but as a postdictor
of eyewitness accuracy and not in the service of theory development.
Future theorizing also must account for metacognitive judgments like pro-
spective and retrospective conﬁdence judgments. The need for a better
understanding of conﬁdence is clear given in Wixted et al.’s (in press)
call for jurors to rely on initial eyewitness conﬁdence. Prospective conﬁ-
dence judgments (do you think you can ID the perpetrator?) might inﬂu-
ence which eyewitnesses are, or are not, shown a lineup. In real crimes,
eyewitnesses sometimes report to the police that they will not be able to
make an ID; perhaps because they did not think they got a good view of
the perpetrator, or were a bystander rather than the victim. How accurate
are those judgments? Do eyewitnesses that believe that they cannotmake an
ID, but nevertheless are shown a lineup, perform more poorly than those
eyewitnesses that believe they can make an ID (and would that be reﬂected
in their level of conﬁdence in that ID)? Finally, the availability of sophis-
ticated neuroscience tools can provide an unparalleled window into
cognitive function. There have been efforts to apply these tools to try to
separate accurate from inaccurate memories (Rosenfeld, Ben Shakhar, &
Ganis, 2012; Schacter, Chamberlain, Gaessar, & Gerlach, 2012). These
tools hold great promise for advancing theory, if the data are interpreted
in the context of appropriate theoretical frameworks (Wixted & Mickes,
2013).
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At the conclusion of Wells, Memon, and Penrod’s (2006) overview of
eyewitness evidence, they propose that eyewitness researchers have been
unadventurous by focusing all their reform efforts on the lineup. Instead,
they ask us to consider what researchers might dream up if the lineup never
existed.
Operating from scratch, it seems likely that modern psychology would have devel-
oped radically different ideas. For instance, brain-activity measures, eye move-
ments, rapid displays of faces, reaction times, and other methods for studying
memory might have been developed instead of the traditional lineup
Wells et al., p. 69.
Although we agree that new ideas and new procedures should be tried, it
is important that these “radically different ideas” are embedded in appro-
priate theoretical frameworks.
5.2 Cost and Beneﬁts
New reforms must consider both beneﬁts and costs. But eyewitness
researchers must rely on policy makers to decide if it is more important to
protect the innocent, implicate the guilty, or whether each is equally impor-
tant. For example, the recent National Academy of Sciences report (Identi-
fying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identiﬁcation, October, 2014)
recommended adopting unbiased lineup instructions. Given that the data
show no discriminability difference between biased and unbiased instruc-
tions (see Clark et al., 2014), this recommendation must be based on the
fact that the National Academy attaches greater social good to protecting
the innocent, which the more conservative responding induced by unbiased
instructions accomplishes. We agree with this recommendation, but point
out that this is a different justiﬁcation for the adoption of this reform than
what was offered by Wells et al. (2000), and that the recommendation
only makes sense if a greater social good is attached to protecting innocent
suspects than protecting innocent victims who may suffer at the hands of
guilty suspects who are incorrectly freed from suspicion.
Once a determination is made of the relative weight to give to beneﬁts
versus costs, SDT can guide researchers in their choice of what reforms are
best at achieving the desired goal. In particular, SDT speciﬁes two factors
that are vital for evaluating diagnostic domains, and for governing where
eyewitnesses place their response criteria (see Clark, 2012, for a review of
this issue). One factor is the relative frequency of target-present versus
target-absent lineups in the criminal justice system. In other words, how
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often do the police put guilty versus innocent suspects into lineups. These
base rates are difﬁcult to estimate. We cannot simply assume that if someone
selected from a lineup is eventually convicted that they were guilty. The
many Innocence Project DNA exonerations disprove that. The base rates
also are inﬂuenced by when different jurisdictions conduct lineups. Some
may choose to conduct a lineup early in an investigation, especially if there
is little other evidence to consider. These lineups might contain a relatively
high number of innocent suspects. Another jurisdiction may conduct a
lineup only after other evidence has created probable cause implicating
the suspect (Wells & Olson, 2003). These lineups might have relatively
few innocent suspects.
As mentioned above in the context of recommending unbiased instruc-
tions, the other factor that inﬂuences where an eyewitness places his or her
response criterion is the utilities of the various responses that result. For
example, if we follow Blackstone’s maxim that it is “. better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer” (Blackstone, 1769, p. 352), the
cost of a false ID is 10x greater than that of a miss, and eyewitnesses should
set a conservative criterion (although not as conservative as if the cost of a
false ID is 100x greater than a miss, as Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1785).
Of course, other policy makers may feel differently (see Volokh, 1997 for
a historical and legal review of the many perspectives on the proper ratio
of false acquittals to false convictions), as might the general public if the
crime is a serious one (de Keijser, de Lange, & van Wilsem, 2014). The
important point, however, is that the choice of these utilities is a matter
for members of society and their policy makers, not eyewitness researchers.
Given that SDT provides the machinery for converting the chosen utilities,
given the base rates, into optimal criteria placement, instructions and proce-
dures can be tailored to induce eyewitnesses, and the criminal justice system
more broadly, to adopt the optimal criteria placements. That is how new
reforms need to be evaluated.
6. CONCLUSIONS
TheU.S. Department of Justice document entitledEyewitness Evidence:
A Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness
Evidence, 1999) proposed a set of guidelines for collecting and preserving
eyewitness evidence (Wells et al., 2000). The proposed reforms were
expected to enhance the accuracy of eyewitness evidence by stipulating
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how to conduct an eyewitness lineup. However, the reforms do not
enhance the accuracy of eyewitness evidence, at best, they increase eyewit-
ness conservatism. Given the number of innocent people who have been
falsely convicted, and the unknown number of innocent people still behind
bars due to faulty eyewitness evidence, increased conservatism is important.
But that was not the promise of these reforms. The goal of this chapter was
to describe how it was that the ﬁeld originally reached the wrong conclu-
sions regarding many of these reforms.
The chapter began by reviewing the empirical evidence supporting the
move to description-matched ﬁller selection, unbiased instructions, sequen-
tial lineup presentation, and the discounting of conﬁdence judgments. We
discussed four reasons why the ﬁeld reached incorrect conclusions regarding
these reforms. The reasons included a failure to appreciate the distinction
between discriminability and response bias, a reliance on summary measures
of performance that conﬂated discriminability and response bias or masked
the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy, the distorting role of
relative judgment theory, and a strong focus on preventing the conviction
of the innocent. We next reexamined the reforms in light of recent empir-
ical data (exhibiting decline effects) and illustrated the importance of alter-
native theoretical formulations that can compete with relative judgment
theory. A possible new system variable reform was discussed whereby a
jury takes the validity of initial eyewitness conﬁdence seriously. However,
this, and future system variable reforms, must be motivated and rigorously
evaluated in the context of theory.
In hindsight, for all the aforementioned reasons, advocacy on behalf of
the sequential lineup and several of the other reforms got ahead of the sci-
ence. In an article titled “Applying applied research: Selling the sequential
line-up,” Lindsay (1999, p. 220) wrote: “Obviously the ﬁrst step in any
application of research is to obtain potentially useful data. This is the area
in which psychologists excel. We identify potential problems and test
possible solutions to those problems.” But eyewitness researchers must be
careful once they step beyond this point. Lindsay goes on to say, “Once a
solution (or at least a superior procedure) has been found and replicated,
we feel justiﬁed in suggesting that practitioners would beneﬁt from altering
their behavior to take advantage of the knowledge generated by our
research.” At some point, everyone who engages in research on an impor-
tant topic like eyewitness ID wants his or her research to have an impact.
However, requiring that any future reforms are understood theoretically is
one way to ensure that advocacy does not get ahead of the science.
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